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Common  wimeIOM among  post-socialist  reformers  has  One long-term consequence of voucher privatization
been to use x'ouche.  insvestment  funds to provide the  with investment funds, according to this view, is a  de
corporate governance needed to restructure  niewly  facto "industrial  policy" of real sector decapitalization in
privatized enterprises after mass privatization efforts.  favor of short-term rent-seeking by fund managers
The idea has been that mass privatization would spread  through board sinecures and lucrative side deals with
rhe ownership too wide and make corporate governance  portfolio companies and through financial market
difficult.  manipulation and paper entrepreneurship  in the
Ellerman examines the likely institutional behavior of  "financial sector."
voucher funds and the possible effects of their  Without strong corporate  governance from the funds
development on a transition economy. Since most policy  and without stable ownership of their own, many
advice has been in favor of voucher privatization with  enterprise managers will exploit the post-socialist version
investrnent finds, Ellerman can be seen as playing the  of the "separation of ownership and control"  to grab
devil's advocate, but his argument is institutional, not  what they can in the form of salaries, bonuses,
statistical. Policymaking requires insight and foresight  perquisites, and side deals.
into how institutions will tend to function.  The most likely results of the strategy of voucher
Fie concludes that voucher funds will introduce a bias  privatization with investment funds may be a two-sided
in the economy away from the real industrial sector  grab fest by fund managers and enterprise managers -
toward an ersatz "financial sector" that will have little if  together with the accompanying drift, stagnation, and
any positive financial role but will be well-protected by  decapitalization of the privatized industrial sector.
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There has been a rough consensus view of privatization among post-socialist reformers and their
western advisors.  The stylized story goes something like this.
Privatize quickly and irreversibly to  prevent a comeback of the nomenklatura.
The  quickest  and  most  politically  popular  technique  is  mass  voucher
privatization.)  However without intermediaries, this would spread the ownership
too wide and would thus create the problem of "corporate governance."  Therefore
voucher  privatization needs  to  be  augmented by voucher  investment funds to
provide the necessary corporate governance for the restructuring of the privatized
enterprises.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the likely institutional behavior of the voucher funds and
the potential effects of their development on a transitional economy.  Since much policy advice
has been in favor of voucher privatization with investment funds, this paper could be seen as
playing the "devil's advocate" by developing the other side of the argument. The argument will
be institutional, not statistical.  Policy-making requires institutional foresight-insight  into how
institutional structures will tend to function.
Why Voucher Investment Funds?
Mutual Funds or Holding Companies?
The main line of the conventional argument is that the investment funds are needed to provide
corporate governance for the restructuring of privatized enterprises.  But what are the options for
a voucher investment fund in a transitional economy?  Is it the post-socialist analogue of a
mutual fund or a holding company-or  is it perhaps some new creation socially engineered
especially for the transition?
In a developed market economy such as the United States or United Kingdom where economic
institutions have had time to evolve, one finds two extremes, the mutual fund (unit trust in the
UK) and the (venture capital) holding company, which have rather opposite institutional logics.
Mutual funds hold a diversified portfolio of shares with only a small percentage from any
given publicly traded company. Mutual funds exercise no direct corporate governance over
l While  voucher  privatization  gives away for free  the bulk of the assets  on the asset  side of the public balance  sheet,
one needs  to consider  the liabilities  side of the balance  sheet  which  includes:
* funding  the daunting  pension  liabilities  and health  care needs  of the aging  population,
. meeting  the interest  and principal  payments  of the public  and foreign  debt,
• funding  the social  safety net and other  economic  dislocation  costs,
* modernizing  the education  system  to face  the new challenges  of a competitive  market  economy,
. paying  to clean up after the environmental  neglect  of the past,  and
* rebuilding  the infrastructure  needed  for a modern  economy.  [see  Ellerman,  Vahcic,  and Petrin 19911companies.  They are the model of the passive institutional owner that lives by the "Wall
Street Rule" of voting with one's feet. Exit is preferred to voice [see Hirschman 1970].
Holding companies operate in a diametrically opposite way (voice). They hold all or almost
all the shares in a portfolio company so that they will reap most of the capital gains from the
development and restructuring of the company. They epitomize the active owner that
exercises voice rather than exit.
The voucher investment funds have been envisioned by post-socialist reformers as a mixture of
mutual funds and holding companies, a chimera with no direct counterpart in an evolved market
economy.  Western-style legislation restricting any mutual fund's share in a single company (e.g.,
a 20% maximum) has been enacted in most voucher investment fund regulations as if the funds
were mutual funds. But then in the next moment, the voucher funds are described as the vehicles
for restructuring the voucherized enterprises as if the funds were holding companies.
There are substantive reasons why the voucher funds will have trouble functioning as mutual
funds operate in the West. Most of the shares owned by the voucher funds have no real market.
In the West only a small percentage of the companies qualify to be publicly traded and even a
smaller percent would qualify in the transitional economies.  Yet the voucher privatization
programs corporatized medium to large socialist enterprises of most any quality, and issued their
shares in return for vouchers.  Then the voucher funds have a portfolio full of shares which are
essentially illiquid at any significant price ("junk shares").
Can the funds operate as restructuring holding companies rather than as illiquid mutual funds?
There seem to be formidable obstacles in the way of the funds operating in that manner.  I shall
argue that the funds typically lack the economic incentive, power, expertise, and capital to carry
out the restructuring function of a holding company.
The Funds'Lack  of Incentive  for Restructuring
A holding company typically owns all or almost all of its portfolio companies so that it will reap
the benefit of all the costs of restructuring the companies.  Yet an investment fund might own
20% or 30% at best in a portfolio company. If the fund undertook all the time, effort, and costs
of restructuring the company, then 70 to 80% of the capital gains would accrue to the other free-
riding shareholders. Thus the fund seems to have little economic motivation for any time-
consuming and costly restructuring in light of the regulations restricting a fund's stake in a
company.  Yet the motivation is much weaker than that.  Each fund may have thousands of
atomized shareholders (citizens who exchanged their voucher for a share in the fund) so control
lies in the hands of the fund management which is typically a separate fund management
company. The fee of the fund management company is usually set by the regulations at a fixed
percent of the net asset value of the portfolio, not the profits or increase in value of the portfolio.2
Thus if a fund management company should take steps to increase the value of a portfolio
company, only a fraction of the increase accrues to the fund and the fund management company
2  See Coffee  [1996] for these  and other  typical  details  of voucher  investment  funds.
2will receive only a small percent of the increase since its fee is a fixed percentage of the total
(net) portfolio value [see Box 1].
Box 1: Lack of Restructuring Incentive
There are other more lucrative  If  a  fund  owned  30%  of  a  company  and  the  fund  management
ways for the fund management  company fee was 3%, then restructuring to increase the value of the
companies to utilize their power  portfolio company by $100 would increase the fee by $100 x  .30 x
without undertaking the difficult  .03 = $0.90  or less  than one percent  of the increase. That is hardly a
recipe to incentivize  enterprise  restructuring. A holding  company in
Job of restructuring.  One way is  the West might receive 90% or more of the value increment due to
simply by reaping the directors'  restructuring  a portfolio  company,  a difference  of two orders of
fees for sitting on the boards of  magnitude  (.90% versus 90%).  Observers should not be  surprised
scores of portfolio companies.  when fund  management  companies  find  more  efficient  ways  to
Another important method of  tunnel  value  out of  portfolio  companies.
siphoning or tunneling value out of portfolio companies is through special contracts and
nontransparent side deals with firms related to the fund management companies.  The profits
made through these bypass firms need not be shared with the other owners of the portfolio
company, not to mention with the citizen-shareholders of the fund.
Investment funds find the trading of shares, transfer pricing, and nontransparent
equity  transactions  far  more  lucrative  than  striving  for  profits  and  dividend
payments through efficient governance.  Indeed, profits and dividends have been
an insignificant source of fund income so far. [Hewer 1997, p. 18]
These arrangements not only reduce the incentive to restructure; they may provide a disincentive.
Selling a controlling stake to a strategic investor would remove the board sinecures for the fund
managers and their friends.  And significant restructuring would probably involve exposing and
eliminating the special side deals and bypass arrangements for the fund management company.
The Funds'Lack  of Leverage  for Restructuring
With a small minority of the shares in a company, a fund will usually lack the embedded power
to deeply restructure the company.  Here again, the investment fund defies the logic of the
holding company having all or almost all the shares in a portfolio company.  Sometimes
coalitions of funds can be formed to exercise more power but the task of restructuring post-
socialist enterprises goes far beyond some sporadic changes at the board level.  Restructuring by
an external agent requires a sustained and single-minded commitment of corporate oversight and
intervention.
Corporate restructuring requires much effort and time,  often years of intensive,
single-minded concentration of resources.  It cannot be imposed successfully from
the  outside  (by  shareholders,  governments,  or  the  public).  It  can  only  be
instigated from  within by  managers able to  carry the  organization with  them.
[Wilson 1994, p. 1671.
While not impossible, it is rather unlikely for such a restructuring effort to be carried out by a
committee of investment funds acting in a coordinated manner.  Furthermore, the funds usually
3have scores of firms in their portfolios so a sustained effort at restructuring a significant number
of the firms is rather unlikely.
There is yet another difficulty in the idea of equity funds being the agents of restructuring.  The
firms in dire need of restructuring are typically candidates for reorganization (if not liquidation)
bankruptcy.  Yet in the bankruptcy process, control shifts away from equity towards debt-from
equity holders to a committee of creditors and a trustee.  Thus it is hard to see how equity funds
would have the legal leverage for restructuring the seriously distressed businesses in the
transitional economies.
The Funds'Lack  of Expertise for Restructuring
The post-socialist enterprises typically require serious restructuring so that they will be able to
produce profitable products that people will want to buy at prices the people are willing to pay.
In spite of the hopes that western firms would become massively involved and would provide
funds and the necessary expertise, this has not happened.  With a few notable exceptions, the
bulk of the post-socialist firms will not be restructured by western strategic investment.
The alternative to direct strategic investment is portfolio investment.  There has been some
modest western portfolio investment in Central European and Russian investment funds.  The
Polish mass privatization has tried to design funds to be managed by "western experts" who
would restructure the companies in their portfolio.  But this approach has not met expectations in
view of the large number of firms in each portfolio, the distance of the fund from the day-to-day
matters of restructuring a company, and the typical lack of industrial expertise on the part of the
fund managers.  The investment funds tend to be managed by "professionals" such as financial
analysts, lawyers, and accountants who have little or no managerial or technical experience in
industry.
The Funds' Lack of Capitalfor Restructuring
The shares in the funds' portfolios were acquired in a capital-free transaction in return for
citizens' vouchers invested in the funds. The capital necessary to start up the funds and the fund
management companies is provided by the founders or by loans, and is usually expended on
equipment, premises, staff salaries, and advertising.  There are usually a large number of funds
relative to the size of the market (e.g., more funds than publicly tradable companies in some
cases). There were sizable advertising costs to differentiate each fund from the others in the
frenzy to attract citizen vouchers.  The fund sponsors have to eventually recover the advertising
and staff costs from the firms themselves.  The firms facing the restructuring costs of the
transition could hardly declare enough dividends so that after covering all the costs of the funds
(through the management fees) that anything would be left over for dividends to the citizen-
shareholders.  Soon the citizen-shareholders will get the idea that the value of their "national
patrimony" is being siphoned off by this layer of financial intermediaries (which could
eventually create a sizable political problem).
The message from the "investment" funds to the portfolio firms is usually "dividends, dividends,
and more dividends" so their real impact is likely to be disinvestment.  Thus capital for
4restructuring is probably the last thing that could be expected from voucher investment funds,
and the argument that voucher dis-investment funds are important for "capital market
development" seems all the more implausible.
Voucher Funds and the Stock Market
Will the voucher funds jump-start the stock market? Expectations in the East about the
importance of public stock markets as a net source of funds have been grossly exaggerated.  In
fact, stock markets in the developed market economies play an rather modest3 role as a net source
of investment finance.
Table 1: Net Sources of Corporate Finance: 1970-1989
Germany  Japan  U.K.  U.S.
Internal  81  69  97  91
Bank finance  I  1  31  20  16
Bonds  -l  5  4  17
New equity  1  4  -10  -9
Trade credit  -2  -8  -1  -4
Other 1/  10  0  -8  -13
1/Capital  transfers, other sources, and statistical adjustment.
Source: Corbett and Jenkinson (1994, 1  1)
One primary purpose of a public capital market is to provide a bridge so that personal savings
can flow into the investments of businesses.
To a large extent equity markets are an interesting and fun sideshow, but they are
not at the heart of the action.  Relatively little capital is raised in equity markets,
even in the United States and the United Kingdom.  One cannot expect equity
markets  to  play  an  important  role  in  raising  funds  in  the  newly  emerging
democracies. [Stiglitz 1994, p. 228]
Furthermore the voucher privatization process does not "jump-start the capital market" since the
whole process of distributing vouchers to citizens and firms distributing shares in return for
vouchers does not move one ducat of capital from savings into investment.  An ersatz "stock
market" in a transitional economy for the secondary trading of voucher-based shares does not
perform that most basic function of a capital market-in  spite of the strong symbolism of the
"stock market" in the popular mind.4 If public stock markets in the West play such a small role
3  Stock  markets  can even  be a negative  net source  of funds  when dividends  and stock buy-backs  (perhaps  financed
by "junk bonds")  outweigh  new share issues.
4 This  may help explain  why the standard  western  advice  ignored  non-equity  corporate  securities  in voucher
privatization. Why distribute  equity  as opposed  to debt instruments  in quasi-bankrupt  companies  to the citizens
when  equity  has the lowest  claim  on corporate  asset value? Aside  from the role of the stock market  in popular
consciousness  in the East and West,  the main  reason  was probably  to keep equity  control  out of the hands  of
insiders  (seen as nomenklatura)  and, if possible,  to distribute  it to financial  intermediaries  seen  to be in "reform-
oriented"  hands.
5in net finance and if the stock markets in the TEs don't even have that role, then it is difficult to
explain the enormous attention and resources devoted to stock markets in the TEs by western
advisors and domestic reformers.
I think  developing and ex-Communist countries should go slow in copying the
financial institutions of the United States or the United Kingdom, or of Japan for
that  matter.  When I read that  Wall  Streeters are visiting  Beijing to  help the
People's Republic establish a stock market, I shudder.  It is far from clear that the
proliferation of financial instruments, market arbitrage opportunities, and paper
transactions in advanced countries has created social product to justify the high-
quality human capital resources it devours. [Tobin 1990, p. 233]
The finite western technical and financial assistance would probably be better used in building up
a sound banking system and an effective commercial court system-than  in promoting
disinvestment-oriented "investment funds" and largely symbolic "stock markets."5
Can Investment Funds Facilitate Foreign Strategic Investment?
If any western portfolio investors should be so adventuresome as to want to invest in illiquid
shares in voucherized enterprises, then the investment funds would surely facilitate that
transaction at an appropriate price.  But it is doubtful that the investment funds will often be the
intermediaries for foreign direct investment. I mentioned above the fund managers' penchant for
side deals which would be incompatible with FDI.  Another simple reason is that investors will
usually prefer asset deals (as opposed to share deals).  Usually the voucherized enterprises
require substantial restructuring which might involve massive labor shedding and scraping of
whole production lines. Rather than buy control of a company in a share deal and have to deal
with all the downsizing, a western investor would usually choose to take the opposite approach
of only buying the specific assets needed (a "pure play").  The investment will be more like a
greenfield investment with some assets drawn from existing enterprises than a takeover
transaction on the stock market.  There might be some exceptional cases where the foreign
investors want control of a brand name or a distribution network and will thus prefer a share deal.
But the bulk of the rather small foreign investment will probably take the form of greenfield
investments and asset deals, and the investment funds and the public stock markets are irrelevant
for those transactions.
5 The "Wall  Street"  mentality  found  in the post-socialist  world  is reminiscent  of the cargo  cults that sprung  up in  the
South Pacific  area after World  War 11  [see "Cargo  Cult Science"  in  Feynman  1985]. During  the War,  many of the
glories  of civilization  were brought  to primitive  people in  the southern  Pacific  by "great  birds from Heaven"  that
landed  at the new airbases  and  refueling  stations  in the region. After  the War,  the great birds  flew back  to Heaven.
The people started "cargo  cults"  to build  mock runways  and wooden  airplanes  in an attempt  to coax the great  birds
full of cargo to return from Heaven. Post-communist  countries,  with  hardly  a commercial  banking  system  to
finance  private  businesses,  have nonetheless  opened  up "stock  exchanges"  to supposedly  kick-start  capitalism.
Government  officials  in East  Europe,  the FSU, and  even Mongolia  proudly  show  the mock stock exchanges,
complete  with  computers  screens  and "Big Boards,"  to western  delegations  (with enthusiastic  coverage  from the
western  business  press) in  the hope that finally  the glories  of a private  enterprise  economy  will descend  upon them
from Heaven.
6Who Governs the Governors?
Who governs the funds?  The relative silence on the question of corporate governance of the
funds is all the more peculiar in light of the relative obsession about corporate governance of the
voucherized enterprises.
However, the inherent risk of this approach to solving the governance problem at
the enterprise level is the possibility of simply recreating the same problem at the
level of the investment funds.  In other words, for the investment funds to perform
an effective governance role, they must themselves be subject to effective control
by their shareholders. [EBRD 1995, p. 136]
Given the power over many firms that might be accumulated in the funds in order for the funds
to play the projected corporate governance role (e.g., in the Czech Republic), the question of the
governance of the funds should be all the more important.
The individuals running the investment funds are not acting on the basis of their ownership rights
in spite of much rhetoric about "private ownership" and "privatization." The funds are
institutions that own the shares.  The fund managers act as agents for the funds.  Indeed the fund
managers are employees of separate fund management companies that have management
contracts with the funds.  The shares in the funds are typically dispersed across a wide swath of
the citizenry so there is a separation of ownership and control of the funds for the usual Berle-
and-Means reasons. 6 Thus the funds have an even greater "corporate governance" problem than
do the corporations whose "corporate governance problem" the funds were supposed to remedy.
Effective control falls to the fund management companies that are related to the funds not by
ownership but by management contracts. 7
Consequences of the Investment Fund Strategy
A New Power Stratum?
If the investment fund strategy succeeds in establishing a new institutional power stratum-as  it
might in the Czech Republic-then  one will have a situation reminiscent of the U.S. economy a
century ago dominated by the huge trusts and robber barons.
6 In some cases,  the voucher  funds are controlled by banks (e.g., in the Czech Republic) which leads to another set
of problems.  But my purpose is to review the standard arguments for the funds, and the voucher funds were not
sold to the public or to the governments as intermediaries for control of corporations by state-owned or controlled
banks.
7 Why do post-socialist reformers and their advisors consider this sort of corporate governance by non-owning and
rather unaccountable agents to be quite acceptable, when at the same time they consider corporate governance
through direct and personal ownership by managers and workers to be so unacceptable?  One hypothesis is that
the fund managers are considered to be acceptable power brokers and professional mandarins (who need no
further "corporate governance") while other groups, such as managers and workers, are seen as "unacceptable"
power-holders.
7Even though concentrated  ownership is desirable from the point of view of
incentives,  the outcome  of Czech privatization  may generate  political backlash if
people  realize  that an important  part of the economy  has been given nearly free to
a very small number  of people. [Roland  1995,  p. 39]
Since the public  rationale  given  for the voucher  investment  funds is so thin and implausible,  it
may be that the funds have  another  unspoken  rationale. In effect,  it could be conjectured  that the
funds were  the conscious  or unconscious  solution  found  to the problem  of creating  an
institutional  basis for the new economic  power-holders.  The government  could not play that role
since  industry  was to be privatized  and the firms  were seen as being controlled  by the old guard.
Thus a new non-state  institutional  stratum  needed  to be found for the new post-socialist  power
elite. In many transitional  economies,  that turned out to be the voucher  investment  funds.
In most of the transitional  economies  with voucher  privatization,  the funds will probably not
obtain the power  they have in the Czech  Republic. The funds will most likely  evolve into rather
dysfunctional  curiosia  of the transition  that are neither  fish nor fowl  by the standards  of a normal
market economy-neither passive mutual  funds operating  in a liquid stock  market  nor Western-
style  holding  companies  actively  restructuring  companies. Their  main effect  will be to slowly
decapitalize  the real sector  in favor  of the financial  sector and conspicuous  post-socialist
consumption.  The funds  themselves  lack  the incentive,  power,  and expertise  to take the place of a
powerful  ownership  group to drive  enterprise  restructuring  and development.
The  Biased  Motivation  of Young  People
The investment  fund strategy  may have  other subtle  and long-term  effects  on the development  of
the transitional  economies. One effect  is on the motivation  of young  people. In the frenzied  get-
rich-quick  atmosphere  of most transitional  economies,  how many ambitious  young  people are
going  to undertake  the long and rigorous  education  program  to become  computer  engineers  or
biochemists? With only a few years  in business  school  or law school,  a young  person  can
perhaps  join the "financial  entrepreneurs"  in the investment  funds and get rich quickly  through
"paper entrepreneurship"  without  soiling  one's hand in the industrial  sector. 8
[B]anks and  investment funds are  attracting the  best  minds of  the  Czech
entrepreneurial class as  sophisticated financial deal have become extremely
rewarding. In comparison,  the second stage of enterprise restructuring--though
more needed than ever--is less rewarding,  more risky, and requires continuous
hard work. [Hewer  1997,  p. 19]
This bias in the motivation  of the next  generation  does  not bode well for the long-run  industrial
health of transitional  economies  (which  can hardly compete  with New York, London,  Frankfurt,
Tokyo, and Hong Kong  as centers  for financial  services).
8See Dertouzos et al. 1989 or Albert 1993 for treatments of this theme.
8Regulatory Capture in the Financial Sector
The attraction of the ersatz financial sector is not restricted to the young people.  The existing
government administrators and advisors see other people getting rich in the private sector as the
result of the government's privatization efforts.  When they leave government, they would also
like to join in the enrichment process (if they have not already done so behind the scenes).  To
join a manufacturing firm and work on restructuring for long-term prosperity would simply take
too long even if a government official had the relevant technical skills.  The financial sector
offers the quickest return to people with the right knowledge and connections.  This aggravates
the short-termism and "grab-what-you-can" mentality inherited from the socialist era.
All this leads to the "regulatory capture" of the existing government privatization administrators
by the investment funds and the rest of the financial sector.  If one sees one's future as working
with certain private organizations, then it is likely that those organizations will receive "special
attention" while one is still in government.  This leads to laws and regulations that are in the best
interests of one's future colleagues (e.g., a fee structure for the fund management companies
based on the size of the fund assets regardless of any increase in value) but are not necessarily in
the best interests of the country as a whole.
The Bias in the Choice of Firm Structure
The regulatory capture of the government administrators who see their future in serving finance
rather than industry may also have powerful long-run consequences in the determination of firm
structure.  Each transitional economy faces a fundamental choice of whether to promote Anglo-
American-type companies (AA-firms) or what might be called Japanese-style companies (J-
firms) [see Blinder 1993]. To oversimplify the question, the AA-firm emphasizes allocative
efficiency based on labor and management mobility while the J-firm emphasizes X-efficiency
[Leibenstein 1987] based on the immobility of labor and management.
To see the contrast between the opposite strategies, consider the best way to get a ship's captain
and crew to keep a ship afloat.  One theory is to make it easy for the captain and crew to transfer
between ships so that a ship's owner can use marketplace mobility to get the best captain and
crew for the job.  The opposite theory is to immobilize the captain and crew so they will give
their best effort to save the ship rather than jump ship when the going gets rough.  If one thinks
that the current captain and crew are hopelessly incompetent and that much better replacements
can be obtained from elsewhere, then one would favor a system emphasizing mobility.  But if
one thinks that a ship is probably stuck with the captain and crew it has (particularly when "at
sea") and that a better captain ("foreign investor") and crew is not coming in time to save the
ship, then one would prefer a system that emphasized immobility and that didn't make it easy to
jump ship. The custom of the captain going down with the ship is an example of the "barriers to
exit" that lead to the "logic of commitment" of the J-firm in contrast to the "logic of exit"
exemplified in the AA-firm [see Kagono and Kobayashi 1994].
The "financial entrepreneurship" of the investment funds depends on the mobility of shares-on
their ability to keep the companies and their shares "in play."  If the companies had the legal
machinery at hand to achieve ownership stability (e.g., obtained with cross-ownership by long-
9term business partners in Japan or with the trust structure of the American companies owned by
their Employee Stock Ownership Plans or ESOPs), then the investment fund strategy would be
thwarted.  Thus the funds and the sympathetic financial sector regulators will do their utmost to
keep the ownership structure of the firms "open" as in the AA-firm.  Yet if the outside saviors
(e.g., foreign strategic investors) are for the most part not coming, then the logic of mobility is
rather pointless and the net effect is to prevent the firms from developing the logic of
commitment as exemplified in the J-firm strategy.
Rent-Seeking or Value Creation?
The bias in firm structure is clearly reflected in the choice of managerial strategies.  As long as
the shares are "in play" and can move around like "marbles on a table top" then managers can
seek to increase their wealth by obtaining more shares on the cheap rather than by creating more
value in the company.  The rent-seeking option is to cheaply get a larger piece of the pie (a
constant or decreasing pie) as opposed to the value creation strategy of increasing the size of the
pie.
Rent-Seeking Option:
Bigger share in same
or smaller pie.
Value-Creation Option:
Bigger Pie so Bigger
Share.
Workers with little or no wage payments (and investments funds desperate for liquidity) are often
sources of cheap shares.  Managers have various sources of cash including aggressive new banks
willing to speculate on getting control of a company. Time honrzons are already tragically short
in the transitional economies,  As long as the rent-seeking option is open to managers, it will be
an overwhelming temptation in comparison with medium and long-term value creation
strategies.  Only when the insider shares are immobilized are the managers forced to create a
bigger pie in order to increase the size of their share of the pie.  Yet the investment funds and
their friendly regulators want to maintain free-floating shares to pursue their own paper
entrepreneurship strategies.
10The Investment Funds Sector as a Rentier Stratum
The long-run effects go well beyond the bias in the choice of firm structure and the
corresponding managerial strategies. In the developing countries, deep-lying economic reforms
usually have to dismantle the power of an older rentier class (e.g., a class of large land owners),
and the anti-communist revolutions in the TEs were based on dismantling the communist rentier
class.  The investment fund strategy moves in the opposite direction of creating a new rentier
stratum that may function as a long-term burden on the industrial sector. The investment funds
did not evolve out of any natural economic process; they provide neither capital nor any relevant
expertise to the real sector. They are essentially creations of a politically inspired privatization
process.  As a rentier stratum, the investment funds extract money out of the productive
enterprises but without performing in return any important economic function (that could not
otherwise be obtained).
Concluding Remarks
In summary, the voucher funds will introduce a bias in the economy away from the real
industrial sector towards an ersatz "financial sector" that will have little if any positive financial
role but will be well-protected by friendly regulators.  On this view, one long-term consequence
of voucher privatization with investment funds is a defacto  "industrial policy" of real sector
decapitalization in favor of short-term rent-seeking by fund managers through board sinecures
and lucrative side deals with portfolio companies and through financial market manipulation and
paper entrepreneurship in the "financial sector."  Without strong corporate governance from the
funds and without stable ownership of their own, many enterprise managers will exploit the post-
socialist version of the "separation of ownership and control" to grab what they can in the form
of salaries, bonuses, perquisites, and side deals. This two-sided grab-fest by fund managers and
enterprise managers-together  with the accompanying drift, stagnation, and decapitalization of
the privatized industrial sector-may  be the most likely results of the strategy of voucher
privatization with investment finds.9
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